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Requiring Plaintiffs to Prove Irreparable Harm: “It Isn’t Right.”  
(Herb Reed Enters, LLC v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc. (9th Cir.2013)) 
By: Anthony Kremer 
 
I. Introduction 
“It isn't right for you to hurt me / It isn't right to make me blue / It isn't right to take my kisses / 
And give them to somebody new. . .” 
–The Platters, It Isn’t Right 1 
The Platters were one of the most popular bands of the 1950s.2 The band was admitted 
into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in 1990, and even today, their music maintains a degree of 
popularity.3  Although band members came and went from their ranks, the trademark everyone 
recognizes them by, “The Platters,” has remained the same.4  Sadly, however, The Platters 
trademark has become the subject of decades of litigation regarding the mark’s ownership, as 
multiple groups have laid claim to and have used the mark since the 1950s.5   
In 2011, it was determined that Herb Reed, the founder of The Platters, owned the rights 
to The Platters trademark.6  At that point, Herb Reed had the right to sue others who used The 
Platters mark unlawfully.7  But another, more daunting, legal question presented itself: whether 
                                                          
1 THE PLATTERS, It Isn’t Right, on ALL-TIME GREATEST HITS (The Island Def Jam Music Group 2004).  The 
procedural history of Herb Reed., LLC, v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., 736 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2013) has had its share of 
clever references to The Platters’ discography.  See id. at 1242 (“[T]he names of The Platters’ hits ironically 
foreshadowed decades of litigation – ‘Great Pretender,’ ‘Smoke Gets In Your Eyes,’ ‘Only You,’ and ‘To Each His 
Own.’”); See also Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm't Mgmt., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102566 (D. Nev. July 24, 
2012) (“In this case, the assignee of founding band member Herb Reed ask the Court to tell Defendants - who 
promote an unlicensed show featuring a group called The Platters - that ‘It Isn't Right.’  Plaintiff asks that the Court 
answer Reed's ‘Prayer,’ and hold that Defendants are a merely [sic] "Great Pretender" while ‘Only You [Reed]’ 
(‘and [Reed] Alone’) owns ‘The Platters’ mark.). 
2 The Platters Biography, THE ROCK AND ROLL HALL OF FAME AND MUSEUM, available at 
http://rockhall.com/inductees/the-platters/bio/. 
3 Id. 
4 See id. 
5 Herb Reed Enters., LLC, 736 F.3d at 1243-45. 
6 Id. at 1244. 
7 See id at 1247. 
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plaintiffs like Herb Reed must prove that damage done to their trademark by infringers cannot be 
adequately compensated by money damages, or whether plaintiffs benefit from a presumption 
that such damage would be irreparable.8  This question has become a critical cog in the 
determination of whether a court should bar a defendant’s illegal use of trademarks, and while 
legal tradition sided with the later stance, this conclusion is under serious fire.9      
Part II of this Casenote provides a basic framework for intellectual property law in the 
United States by analyzing the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, and existing case law.  Part II 
also explains how courts have previously evaluated the need for injunctions in lawsuits.  Part III 
discusses the case Herb Reed Enters, LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt. and the Ninth Circuit’s holding 
that irreparable harm cannot be presumed in a trademark infringement context.  Part IV critiques 
the Ninth Circuit’s analysis.  Finally, Part V concludes that the presumption of irreparable harm 
should continue to be implemented in trademark infringement cases where the plaintiff is 
seeking a preliminary injunction.       
II. Background 
A. Intellectual Property Law 
1. Basis, Rationale, and Purpose 
Intellectual property consists of “intangible rights [which] protect[ ] commercially 
valuable products of the human intellect.”10  Three predominant types of intellectual property are 
patents, copyrights, and trademarks.11  Patents are a “governmental grant of the exclusive right to 
                                                          
8 See id. at 1248-49. 
9 See id. 
10 Black’s Law Dictionary 930 (10th ed. 2014). 
11 Id. Other kinds of intellectual property include “trade-secret rights, publicity rights, moral rights, and rights 
against unfair competition.” Id.  
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use an invention”12 such as new processes, machines, methods of manufacturing, and 
compositions of matter.13  Copyrights are intellectual property rights in an “original work[ ]  of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”14  Common types of works protected by 
copyright are literary, musical, and dramatic works, as well as motion pictures and sound 
recordings.15  Finally, trademarks are “word[s], phrase[s], logo[s], or other sensory symbol[s] 
used . . .  to designate the source of goods or services.”16  Apple® and its bitten apple logo are 
examples of well-recognized trademarks.17  Patent legislation is embodied in the Patent Act,18 
copyright legislation in the Copyright Act,19 and trademark legislation in the Lanham Act.20  
Each of these predominant types of intellectual property have certain legal foundations.21  
Copyrights and patents have their foundation in the Intellectual Property Clause of the 
Constitution, which states that Congress has the power “[t]o promote the progress of science and 
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries.”22  “Useful arts” refers to patent law, and “science” refers to 
copyrights.23  The basis for trademark law in the United States, however, is not so clearly defined 
in the Constitution.24  The Supreme Court has declared that trademark law cannot be justified by 
the Intellectual Property Clause.25  Instead, Congress’s ability to regulate trademarks comes from 
                                                          
12 Black’s Law Dictionary 1046 (10th ed. 2014). 
13 35 USCS § 101.  
14 17 USCS 102.   
15 Id. 
16 Black’s Law Dictionary 1721 (10th ed. 2014); see also 15 USCS § 1127. 
17 See Apple Trademarks List, APPLE, available at http://www.apple.com/legal/intellectual-
property/trademark/appletmlist.html. 
18 See generally 35 USCS. 
19 See generally 17 USCS. 
20 See generally 15 USCS. 
21 See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879). 
22 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
23 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §1.02 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.). 
24 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 93-94. 
25 Id.  
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the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.26  That clause states that Congress has the right to 
“regulate commerce . . . among the several states.”27   
There are also certain rationales and purposes behind patent, copyright, and trademark 
law.28  Patents, according to the Supreme Court, “foster and reward invention” by giving 
inventors an economic monopoly on their inventions, “promote[ ] the disclosure of inventions to 
stimulate further innovation,” and create a public domain of knowledge for the public to use.29  
Similarly, an often cited justification for copyright law is that it encourages authors to produce 
creative works for public consumption by protecting an author’s rights to benefit economically 
from those works.30  The rationale behind trademark law, however, is different.31  Trademarks 
serve two important functions in society:  “to protect both consumers from deception and 
confusion over trade symbols and to protect the plaintiff's infringed trademark as property.”32 
2. Causes of Action 
The owner of a patent, copyright, or trademark, has relatively exclusive rights to that 
intellectual property and the ability to prevent others from using it.33  The use of another’s 
intellectual property without permission is called “infringement.”34  Particularly, in order to 
                                                          
26 See 17 USCS §1127; See also S. Rep. No 79-1133, at 4-5 (2d Sess. 1946).   
27 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
28 Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); 1 J. 
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:2 (4th ed.). 
29 Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262. 
30 See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219. 
31 See MCCARTHY, supra note 28. 
32 Id. (citing Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco 
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 782, n.15 (1992) (J. Stevens, concurring).    
33 See 35 USCS § 154 (“Every patent shall [give the patent holder]. . . the right to exclude others from making, 
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention. . .”); 17 U.S.C.S. § 106 (“[T]he owner of copyright. . . has the 
exclusive rights . . . (1)  to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies . . . (3)  to distribute copies . . . of the 
copyrighted work to the public by sale . . . or by rental, lease, or lending[.]”); 15 U.S.C.S. § 1115 (“[A] mark 
registered . . . [under] this Act [gives] . . . the registrant[ ] exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on 
or in connection with the goods or services specified in the registration[.]”). 
34 See Black’s Law Dictionary 900 (10th ed. 2014). 
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prove trademark infringement, a plaintiff must prove that he or she is “(1) the owner of a valid, 
protectable mark, and (2) that the alleged infringer is using a confusingly similar mark.”35  To 
gauge whether the defendant’s mark is confusingly similar to the plaintiff’s mark, courts will 
consider the following factors: 
(1) strength of the mark, (2) proximity of the goods, (3) similarity of the marks, (4) 
evidence of actual confusion, (5) marketing channels used, (6) type of goods and the 
degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser, (7) defendant's intent in selecting 
the mark, and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines.36 
 
These factors are collectively referred to as the “likelihood of confusion” standard, and it is 
relatively similar across state and federal jurisdictions.37  A plaintiff need not demonstrate that all 
of these factors weigh in their favor nor that actual confusion with consumers exists.38  
Ultimately, if the court finds trademark infringement, the consumer goodwill associated with the 
plaintiff’s marks is deemed at risk because consumers might believe the infringing products or 
services are that of the plaintiff.39  If these products and services are of poor quality, that might 
prevent consumers from purchasing the products and services of the plaintiff.40  In instances like 
these, plaintiffs can seek relief through the courts.41   
 Another cause of action in trademark law is trademark dilution.42  Trademark dilution 
occurs when one attempts to make an association between his or her mark and an already famous 
mark, resulting in the famous mark becoming less distinctive or causing harm to the reputation of 
                                                          
35 Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 2013). 
36 AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added). 
37 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:1:50 (4th ed.).   
38 See Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 348, 353. 
39 See 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:47 (4th ed.). 
40 Id.  
41 See id. at § 30:1. 
42 15 USCS § 1125(c). 
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the famous mark.43  Plaintiffs in trademark dilution cases are capable of seeking relief through 
the courts “regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or 
of actual economic injury.”44 
3. Injunctive Relief 
Two common forms of relief in intellectual property cases are preliminary and permanent 
injunctions.45  Injunctions are equitable remedies that, in the context of intellectual property 
infringement cases, force a potential or found infringer to cease copying another’s intellectual 
property.46  Preliminary injunctions, if granted, take effect before and during an infringement 
trial.47  Permanent injunctions can be granted once the trial court has found infringement.48  In 
order for a plaintiff to receive a preliminary injunction, they must demonstrate: 
[1] [T]hat [the plaintiff] is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that [the plaintiff] is likely 
to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of 
equities tips in [the plaintiff’s] favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.49   
 
The second factor, irreparable harm, refers to damages that cannot be remedied with money 
damages.50  If a plaintiff is able to prove that these four items exist in a trademark infringement 
context, they can receive a preliminary injunction to stop a potential infringer’s actions until a 
final decision is made at trial.51  However, plaintiffs must also place a bond with the court before 
the injunction can be granted.52  If the trial court does find infringement, the court could then 
                                                          
43 15 USCS § 1125(c)(2)(B),(C). 
44 15 USCS § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
45 McCarthy, supra note 39, at § 30:1. 
46 Id. at § 30:4. 
47 See 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEURE § 2947 (3d ed.). 
48 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:1. 
49 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).   
50 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:46.   
51 Id. at § 30:1. 
52 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c).   
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grant a permanent injunction as well as money damages.53  The test for determining whether a 
permanent injunction is appropriate is fundamentally the same as that for a preliminary 
injunction, except instead, there must be a finding that the plaintiff has suffered irreparable 
harm.54 
B. Related Case Law 
Traditionally, courts have applied a presumption of irreparable harm in trademark 
infringement cases.55  A presumption is a rebuttable “legal inference or assumption that a fact 
exists because of the known or proven existence of some other fact or group of facts.”56  
Presumptions of irreparable harm have been applied in trademark cases, largely because courts 
have found that the reputational harm done to plaintiffs by a defendant is “virtually impossible to 
quantify in terms of monetary damages.”57  Some courts justify the presumption based on the 
strength of a plaintiff’s case of likelihood of confusion.58  If the case for likelihood of confusion 
is stronger, courts are more likely to presume irreparable harm than if the case for likelihood of 
confusion was very weak.59  Importantly, the presumption in trademark infringement cases, like 
                                                          
53 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:1. 
54 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). (“A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that [the 
plaintiff] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and 
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction.”).  
55 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, § 30:46 (4th ed.).   
56 Black’s Law Dictionary 1376 (10th ed. 2014). 
57 Groupe SEB United States, Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192, 205 n.8 (3d Cir. 2014); See also Kraft 
Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 735 F.3d 735, 741 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[I]rreparable 
harm is especially likely in a trademark case because of the difficulty of quantifying the likely effect on a brand of a 
nontrivial period of consumer confusion.”). 
58 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:45. 
59 See e.g. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 735 F.3d at 740 ("[T]he more likely it is the plaintiff will succeed on the 
merits, the less the balance of irreparable harms need weigh towards its side; the less likely it is the plaintiff will 
succeed, the more the balance need weigh towards its side."); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:45.  
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other legal presumptions, is rebuttable; a defendant still has a chance to show the court that their 
potentially infringing activities will not result in irreparable harm to the plaintiff.60   
The presumption of irreparable harm, however, has come under increasing judicial 
scrutiny in light of two recent Supreme Court rulings:  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC and 
Winter v Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.61  These two decisions, both of which came out within 
the past decade, have greatly influenced the discussion of injunctions and irreparable harm in 
trademark infringement cases, notwithstanding the fact that neither case discusses trademark law 
nor mentions the presumption of irreparable harm.62  While some circuit courts continue to apply 
a presumption of irreparable harm in trademark infringement cases,63 some have begun to 
question the practice,64 and others, including the Ninth Circuit, now reject the presumption.65    
a. eBay Inc., v. MercExchange, LLC 
In eBay Inc., v. MercExchange, LLC, eBay and one of its subsidiaries, Half.com, were 
sued by MercExchange for patent infringement.66  MercExchange claimed that eBay and 
Half.com infringed MercExchange’s patent, which covered “electronic market design[ ] to 
facilitate the sale of goods between private individuals by establishing a central authority.”67  At 
trial, the district court found that eBay and Half.com had infringed MercExchange’s patent, but 
                                                          
60 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:47. 
61 See generally Jeffery M. Sanchez, Comment, The Irreparably Harmed Presumption? Why the Presumption of 
Irreparable Harm in Trademark Law Will Survive eBay and Winter, 2011 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 535. 
62 Id.  
63 See, e.g., Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 708 F.3d 614, 627 (5th Cir. 2013). 
64 See, e.g., N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008). 
65 Herb Reed Enters, LLC v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir. 2013). 
66 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006). 
67 Id.  
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MercExchange was denied a permanent injunction.68  The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit reversed and granted the injunction because of the finding of patent infringement.69 
The Supreme Court ultimately vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision.70  Neither the 
district court, nor the appellate court, according to the Supreme Court, had correctly applied the 
four-factor test to determine if a permanent injunction was appropriate, given eBay and 
Half.com’s infringement.71  The Patent Act, the Court stressed, states that injunctions “may [be] 
issue[d] only in accordance with the principles of equity” and that the principles of equity dictate 
that all four factors exist.72  Congress, the Court hinted, could indicate through legislation a 
departure from these principles of equity if necessary.73  As a result, the Court declared that the 
“categorical grant” of an injunction upon a finding of patent is improper.74  The Court also 
alluded that the same line of reasoning applies to copyright infringement cases and other suits 
governed by the rules of equity.75  The majority opinion did not reference trademark law.76   
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, while concurring with the majority opinion, 
added caveats to it.77  In his concurring opinion, Justice Roberts observed that “there is a 
difference between exercising equitable discretion pursuant to the established four-factor test and 
writing on an entirely clean slate.”78  He went on to imply that in applying the Court’s rationale 
in eBay, courts must be mindful of historical practice.79  Justice Kennedy, in his own 
                                                          
68 Id. at 390-91. 
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 394. 
71 Id. at 393-94. 
72 Id. at 394 (internal quotes omitted; emphasis added). 
73 Id. at 392. 
74 Id. at 393-94. 
75 Id. at 394. 
76 See generally id.  
77 See id. at 394-97. (JJ. Roberts and Kennedy, concurring). 
78 Id. at 396-97. (J. Roberts, concurring). 
79 Id. (J. Roberts, concurring). 
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concurrence, echoed Justice Roberts’ concerns, stating, “historical practice . . . is most helpful 
and instructive when the circumstances of a case bear substantial parallels to litigation the courts 
have confronted before.”80  He also noted that the court’s conclusion on irreparable harm was 
appropriate in the patent context:   
When the patented invention [at issue] is but a small component of the product the 
companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue 
leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the 
infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.81  
 
b. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 
Another case recently decided by the Supreme Court that discusses injunctions is Winter 
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.82  In Winter, the U.S. Navy had developed and used a 
technology called MFA sonar to detect underwater submarines.83  The Navy was sued by the 
Natural Resources Defense Council and others which claimed that the MFA sonar caused great 
physical and social harm to marine mammals.84  The ultimate result of the complex trial and 
appellate proceedings was a preliminary injunction that limited the Navy’s ability to use MFA 
sonar.85  In their analysis of irreparable harm, both the trial court and the Ninth Circuit 
determined that the “possibility” that marine life would be injured through use of MFA sonar 
constituted irreparable harm that weighed in favor of an injunction.86 
 The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and vacated the 
injunction.87  The mere possibility of irreparable harm, the Court declared, was too lax of a 
                                                          
80  Id. (J. Kennedy, concurring). 
81 Id. (J. Kennedy, concurring; emphasis added). 
82 See generally Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
83 Id. at 12-13. 
84 Id. at 17-18. 
85 Id. at 19-20. 
86 Id. at 21-22. 
87 Id. at 33. 
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standard to apply to a remedy as powerful as a preliminary injunction.88  Instead, the Court 
surmised that judges should apply the same standard they always have:  a likelihood of 
irreparable harm.89  The Supreme Court admitted that, given the evidence at trial, a likelihood of 
irreparable harm could still be proven, but the Court still reprimanded the lower courts for not 
considering the Navy’s willingness to abide by some of the restrictions already in place before 
upholding the stricter injunction.90 That, combined with the fact that the Navy had been using 
MFA sonar for over forty years, cast doubt on whether irreparable harm was truly occurring.91  
In the end, the Court declared a decision on the likelihood of irreparable harm was not needed 
since the public interest factor weighed in favor of letting the Navy continue using the MFA 
sonar.92  To the Court, there was not a real enough threat to marine mammals to justify 
handicapping the Navy’s training exercises and use of MFA sonar.93   
C. Aftermath in the Circuit Courts 
In light of the Supreme Court’s rulings in eBay and Winter, the circuit and district courts 
are being forced to answer whether presumptions of irreparable harm should continue to exist.94  
For example, now neither the Second Circuit nor the Ninth Circuit applies a presumption of harm 
in copyright cases.95  In addition, the Third Circuit has recently held in a false advertising 
lawsuit, Ferring Pharms, Inc. v. Watson Pharms, Inc., that it violated the principles of equity to 
                                                          
88 Id. at 22. 
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 22-23. 
91 Id. at 23. 
92 Id. at 26. 
93 Id. 
94 See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 94 (2nd Cir. 2010); Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 
F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2014). 
95 See Salinger, 607 F.3d at 94; See also Flexible Lifeline Sys. V. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F. 3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 
2011).   
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allow a presumption of irreparable harm in any cases arising under the Lanham Act.96  Such a 
presumption, the Third Circuit declared, “function[ed] as an automatic or general grant of an 
injunction . . . inconsistent with [the] principles of equity.”97   
Not surprisingly, the debate has also turned directly on whether a presumption of 
irreparable harm should continue to apply in trademark cases, and while some circuits have 
recognized the issue, they have failed to decide on it.98  For example, in North American Medical 
Corporation v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit recognized that the presumption of 
irreparable harm has come under fire since eBay but “decline[d] to decide whether . . . trademark 
infringement gives rise to a presumption of irreparable injury.”99  The Eleventh Circuit asserted 
that upon remand, it was entirely within the district court’s discretion to rule that the presumption 
of irreparable harm was “an appropriate exercise of its discretion in light of the historical 
traditions” cited by Justices Roberts and Kennedy in eBay.100     
Another prominent example of this is found in the Fifth Circuit decision Paulsson 
Geophysical Services v. Sigmar.101  After first finding for the plaintiff, based on a likelihood of 
success on the merits for trademark infringement,102 the court declared that it would not 
expressly endorse a presumption of irreparable harm and noted the presumption posed “a 
difficult question” in light of eBay.103  However, the court found that the likelihood of trademark 
infringement was a serious threat to the plaintiff’s goodwill in new markets where the plaintiff 
                                                          
96 Ferring Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d at 216. 
97 Id. at 217. 
98 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:47:30. (citing, inter alia, Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Medical 
News Now Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 98 (1st Cir. 2011); North America Medical Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 
44, 50 (11th Cir. 2008)).   
99 N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008). 
100 Id.  
101 Paulsson Geophysical Servs. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 2008). 
102 Id. at 312. 
103 Id. at 313.    
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was trying to develop.104  The threat of losing these markets due to the infringing acts of the 
defendant, the court found, could not be quantified and were, thus, irreparable.105 
The Sixth Circuit has avoided commenting on the issue entirely.106  For example, in Audi 
AG v. D’Amato, the Sixth Circuit found that the defendant, D’Amato, had infringed Audi’s 
automobile trademarks by registering the website “www.audisport.com” and selling goods 
bearing Audi trademarks.107  The court, citing eBay, also approved the district court’s granting of 
a permanent injunction.108  The court found that, if D’Amato’s infringing activities were not 
stopped, Audi would be irreparably harmed.109  The court never mentioned nor commented on 
the presumption of irreparable harm.110  
Following its avoidance of the issue in Paulsson, the Fifth Circuit, as well as the Third 
Circuit, have taken explicit stances on the presumption.111  In 2013, the Fifth Circuit declared 
“[T]here seems little doubt that money damages are inadequate to compensate [the owner] for 
continuing acts of [the infringer].”112  However, the Third Circuit’s Ferring decision provided “a 
plaintiff must establish irreparable harm . . . in a trademark infringement case” to receive a 
preliminary injunction.113  In spite of this, the Third Circuit has since then declared in Groupe 
SEB United States, Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC that “the logic underlying the presumption . . 
                                                          
104 Id.   
105 Id.  
106 See generally Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2006). 
107 Id. at 542-545. 
108 Id. at 550. 
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
111 See Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 708 F.3d 614, 627 (5th Cir. 2013); Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., 
Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2014). 
112 Abraham, 708 F.3d at 627 (internal quotations omitted). 
113 Ferring Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d at 216 (“We agree with the holding and rationale of the Herb Reed court”) 
(citing Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc., 736 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
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. inform[s] how [courts] exercise [their] equitable discretion in [each] case.”114  That logic 
consisted of the notions that trademark infringement: 
“necessarily causes . . . product harm by diminishing its value in the mind of consumers . 
. . [and that such] harm necessarily caused to reputation and goodwill is irreparable 
because it is virtually impossible to quantify in terms of monetary damages.”115    
 
In Euro-Pro, the court applied this same logic in a false-advertising case and granted a 
preliminary injunction largely by pointing to the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits 
and the competitive nature of the plaintiff and defendant.116  The court asserted that it was “not 
connecting these facts using a veiled presumption of irreparable harm,” but instead “drawing [a] 
fair inference[ ] from the facts in the record.”117   
III. Herb Reed Enters, LLC v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc. 
The litigation leading up to the Ninth’s Circuit’s Herb Reed decision spanned several 
decades and the entire country.118  Throughout the 1950s, “The Platters” were a “global 
sensation.”119  During the band’s glory days, each of the bands five original members assigned 
their rights to the name “The Platters” to their manager’s company, Five Platters, Inc. (FPI).  
However, following the band’s breakup in the 1960s, each member of the former band, and 
various organizations associated with it, continued using some form of The Platters mark.120   
Not surprisingly, litigation over use of The Platters mark ensued; beginning in 1972, and 
continuing for many years after that, a complicated series of lawsuits were filed in California, 
                                                          
114 Groupe SEB United States, Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192, 205 n.8 (3d Cir. 2014). 
115 Id.  
116 Id. at 205-207. 
117 Id. (emphasis added).  
118 Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1243-45 (9th Cir. 2013). 
119 Id. at 1242-43. 
120 Id.  
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New York, Florida, and Nevada regarding the rights to The Platters mark.121  In 2011, Herb Reed 
Enterprises (HRE), an organization formed to manage the business of The Platters’ founding 
member, Herb Reed, obtained a default judgment in Nevada that declared FPI never had the 
rights to The Platters mark and that Herb Reed “has superior rights to the mark [over] all others, 
including FPI and anyone claiming rights from or through FPI.”122     
Subsequently, HRE filed a trademark infringement suit against Larry Marshak and his 
music organizing and promoting company, Florida Entertainment Management, Inc. for fielding 
bands under the name The Platters.123  Marshak claimed he had received rights to The Platters 
mark through a series of transactions beginning with FPI.124  The district court concluded that 
HRE had senior rights to the mark and that Marshak was using a confusingly similar—indeed, 
the exact same—mark.125  In doing so, a likelihood of success on the merits had been 
established.126 
While recognizing the historical tradition of presuming irreparable harm in trademark 
infringement cases, the district court chose not to apply the presumption in light of Supreme 
Court and Ninth Circuit precedent.127  However, the court still concluded that the likelihood of 
Marshak’s infringement, as well as the likely infringement of countless other bands, would cause 
irreparable harm to HRE if an injunction were not granted.128  The court also found that the 
hardships likely to result from the damage to HRE’s mark outweighed Marshak’s hardship of 
                                                          
121 Id. at 1243-45. 
122 Id. at 1244. (internal quotes omitted). 
123 Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm't Mgmt., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102566, at *17 (D. Nev. July 24, 2012). 
124 Herb Reed, 736 F.3d at 1245. 
125 Herb Reed, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102566, 2012 at *34-35. 
126 Id.  
127 Id. at *43-44. (citing eBay lnc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006); Flexible Lifeline Systems, 
Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 1000 (9th Cir.2011)). 
128 Id.  
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having to identify its “Platters” bands as tribute bands.129  Finally, citing to the fact that 
trademark law is supposed to prevent consumer confusion, the court declared that an injunction 
against Marshak would accomplish that goal.130 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court.131  The reason for 
the reversal centered largely on the presence, or lack thereof, of evidence of irreparable harm.132  
The Ninth Circuit, like the district court, affirmatively declared that a presumption of irreparable 
harm could no longer be applied to trademark infringement cases.133  In coming to this 
conclusion, the Ninth Circuit observed that both the Patent Act and Lanham Act state that 
“injunctions may be granted in accordance with ‘the principles of equity.’”134  The Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that since eBay required all of the permanent injunction factors to be proven in the 
patent context as a result of this language, the same result should occur in the trademark context 
since it, too, used the same statutory language.135   
Going beyond that, however, the court also held that eBay’s holding (that all four factors 
must be established to grant permanent injunctions in patent infringement cases) applies to 
preliminary injunctions in trademark infringement cases as well.136   The court believed this 
conclusion was consistent with its application of no presumption of irreparable harm in obtaining 
preliminary injunctions in copyright infringement cases and permanent injunctions in trademark 
                                                          
129 Id.  
130 Id.   
131 Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir. 2013). 
132 Id.  
133 Id.  
134 Id. at 1249 (citing 35 USCS § 283; 15 USC § 1116(a)). 
135 Id.    
136 Id. at 1250. 
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cases.137  This decision, the Ninth Circuit declared, put it on the same page with the Eleventh and 
Sixth Circuits.138   
The Ninth Circuit criticized the district court for reasoning solely with “platitudes” and 
asserted that the district court’s conclusion of irreparable harm was, essentially, based “solely on 
a strong case for infringement.”139  All this did, the court declared, was “collapse[ ] the 
likelihood of success and irreparable harm factors.”140  The Ninth Circuit declared that 
“[e]vidence of loss of control over business reputation and damage to goodwill could constitute 
irreparable harm.”141  In the end, the Ninth Circuit found no evidence in the record to indicate 
that irreparable harm was likely without a preliminary injunction and remanded it back to the 
district court without looking into the other preliminary injunction factors.142  The Supreme 
Court denied certiorari of the case in October 2014.143 
IV. Discussion 
 The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Herb Reed is deeply concerning, as well as its 
conclusion that a presumption of irreparable harm can no longer be applied at the preliminary 
injunction phase of trademark infringement litigation.  Chief among the court’s flawed reasoning 
is the Ninth Circuit’s failure to recognize that trademarks are simply different from patents, 
copyrights, and other types of legal and equitable harms—a notion that has been consistently 
recognized by the Supreme Court.  Furthermore, a careful analysis of eBay and Winter 
                                                          
137 Id. at 1249 (citing Flexible Lifeline Sys. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2011); Reno Air 
Racing Ass'n, Inc., v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
138 Id. (citing N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228-29 (11th Cir. 2008); Audi AG v. 
D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 550 (6th Cir. 2006). 
139 Id. at 1250.   
140 Id.  
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm't Mgmt., 135 S.Ct. 57 (2014). 
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demonstrate that, in abandoning the presumption, the Ninth’s Circuit’s reliance on these 
decisions is misplaced.  In addition, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly concluded the Eleventh and 
Sixth Circuits agree that the presumption of irreparable harm no longer applies in trademark 
infringement cases.  The Ninth Circuit also failed to realize that even if the express presumption 
of harm were taken away, its spirit and effect would necessarily continue to influence cases.  
Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s assertion that the presumption of irreparable harm neutralizes the 
principles of equity is unfounded, because the presumption, by itself, cannot result in the 
granting of an injunction.   
A. Trademarks Are Different Than Other Forms of Intellectual Property 
The Supreme Court has unfailingly recognized that, despite their shared moniker of 
“intellectual property,” trademarks are different from both copyrights and patents and should not 
be treated the same.144  In the past, for example, the Court has declared that trademarks have a 
different constitutional foundation from patents and copyrights,145 that trademark rights are 
gained and maintained in different fashions than patents and copyrights,146 and that trademarks 
have a different standard for contributory liability than copyrights.147  Perhaps, most importantly, 
the Supreme Court has illustrated that the purposes of trademark law, primarily the protection of 
                                                          
144 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984) (“We have consistently 
rejected the proposition that a similar kinship exists between copyright law and trademark law, and in the process of 
doing so have recognized the basic similarities between copyrights and patents.”).   
145 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879) (asserting that the foundation of trademark law cannot be found in 
the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution).   
146 United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918)  (asserting that, unlike patents and 
copyrights, trademarks confer no “right in gross” and can only be maintained through continued use in commerce 
regulated by Congress and the States); see also Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94  (asserting that trademark 
recognition often depends solely on use, versus patents and copyrights which depend on criteria including 
“originality . . . novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the brain.”).   
147 Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19.  (“Given the fundamental differences between copyright law and trademark law . . . 
we do not look to the standard for contributory infringement set forth in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives 
Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854-855 (1982)[.]”).  
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consumers from infringing goods, is different from that of patent and copyright law, which is to 
promote the creation of inventions and creative works for public consumption.148  An 
understanding of these distinctions also demonstrates why the Supreme Court’s holdings in eBay 
and Winter are consistent with the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark infringement 
cases.149      
In addition to these differences with copyrights and patents, trademark infringement 
represents a different kind of harm because it is an injury that is often recognized as being 
inherently irreparable.150  Owners of a trademark do not want to be compensated for damage 
done to their trademark; they want to act quickly to prevent the damage from occurring in the 
first place or limit the amount of damage done, making the preliminary injunction the natural 
tool to accomplish this.151  Trademark infringement causes of action allow plaintiffs to receive 
preliminary injunctions even if there is no actual confusion that has resulted in economic 
harm.152  If no evidence of actual confusion or economic harm need exist for a court to grant a 
preliminary injunction, then it is unclear, at best, what evidence is needed to satisfy the Herb 
Reed court that irreparable harm exists in a trademark infringement cases.153      
The notion that a legal harm can be inherently irreparable is neither novel nor exclusive 
to trademark law.154  Indeed, courts have determined that irreparable harm could be presumed in 
                                                          
148 Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Inwood 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 
U.S. 763, 782, n.15, 112 S. Ct. 2753, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1081 (1992) (J. Stevens, concurring).    
149 This idea is discussed more fully below in Part IV, Section B. 
150 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:46; see also WRIGHT AND MILLER, supra note 47, at § 2948.1.  
151 See id. As McCarthy aptly analogizes: “Like trying to un-ring a bell, trying to ‘compensate’ after the fact for 
damage to business goodwill and reputation cannot constitute just or full compensation [to a trademark owner].” Id.  
Even more than that, money damages do nothing to remedy the confusion that consumers may or may not have 
already experienced.   
152 See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348, 353 (9th Cir. 1979); 15 USCS § 1125(c)(1). 
153 See MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:47. 
154 See Sanchez, supra note 61, at 560. 
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cases where plaintiffs have proven a likelihood of success on the merits that their rights have 
been violated, including cases involving First Amendment freedoms, broadcasting without a 
license, and Title VII employment discrimination.155  As a result of the different constitutional 
foundations, purposes, and nature of the harms associated with trademark law, it simply does not 
make sense for the Ninth Circuit to unhesitatingly apply eBay and Winter to trademark 
infringement cases.           
B. The Presumption in Trademark Cases Is Consistent with eBay and Winter 
A closer look at eBay and Winter illustrates that the presumption of irreparable harm in 
trademark cases is consistent with those decisions.156  There is much evidence to suggest that 
eBay leaves the presumption unaffected.157  One reason is that the issue in eBay was whether or 
not an injunction should be entered immediately upon a finding of infringement in a patent case, 
essentially barring analysis of any of the injunction factors.158  However, at issue in cases such as 
Herb Reed is not whether the injunction factors should be ignored upon a likely finding of 
trademark infringement, but whether just one factor, irreparable harm, can be presumed.159    
In addition, even if the eBay decision stood for the general proposition that each factor, 
including irreparable harm, must be demonstrated before an injunction can ever be granted, there 
is evidence suggesting that this should not affect the presumption of irreparable harm in 
trademark infringement suits.160  Firstly, trademarks are not mentioned once in eBay.161  This 
                                                          
155 Id. at 560-61. 
156 Id. at 555. 
157 See generally eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
158 See id. at 391; See also Sanchez, supra note 61, at 555. 
159 Brief for the International Trademark Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Herb Reed 
Enterprises, LLC v. Florida Entertainment Management, Inc. and Larry Marshak 135 S.Ct. 57 (2014) (No. 13-1271), 
16-17; See also Sanchez, supra note 61, at 555. 
160 See generally eBay Inc., 547 U.S 388. 
161 Id. at 394. 
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fact is especially noteworthy in light of the fact that the majority decision outlined similarities 
between the patent and copyright holders, including “the right to exclude others from using” the 
patents or copyrights at issue, as well as the fact that the Patent and Copyright Acts contain 
similar language regarding when courts may grant injunctions.162  The Ninth Circuit leaned 
heavily on the fact that the Patent Act and Lanham Act both assert that injunctions are supposed 
to be granted “in accordance with the principles of equity,” but failed to reconcile this assertion 
with the fact that the Supreme Court in eBay left out trademarks in its discussion of how the 
Patent and Copyright Act are also similarly worded.163    
Secondly, both Justices Roberts’ and Kennedy’s concurring decisions suggest that the 
application of eBay outside of the patent context should be practiced cautiously.164  Justice 
Roberts clearly indicated in his decision that the court’s conclusion in eBay was directed at 
longstanding practices in patent litigation and further suggested that the manner in which the 
injunction factors have been applied historically in other contexts should not be cast aside in 
light of eBay.165  Justice Kennedy echoed these concerns and also asserted that the primary goal 
of patent law, creating inventions beneficial to the public by incentivizing inventors, can still be 
realized even when products contain infringing components by potentially allowing the product 
to go to market and simply giving legal damages to the plaintiff.166  This would not be the case 
with products containing infringing trademarks; an infringing trademark, unlike a small patented 
                                                          
162 Id. at 392-93; see also Sanchez, supra note 61, at 555. 
163 Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 35 USCS § 283; 
15 USCS § 1116(a)). 
164 See eBay, 547 U.S. at 394-97 (JJ. Roberts and Kennedy, concurring). 
165 Id. at 395. 
166 See id. at 395-97. 
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component of a product, is reason enough to prevent the product from reaching the public, 
because a main purpose of trademark law is to protect consumers from misidentified goods.167 
Similarly, there is substantial evidence to suggest that Winter, likewise, does not affect 
the presumption of harm in trademark infringement cases.168   For example, Winter, like eBay, 
never mentioned a presumption of irreparable harm, much less ruled that such a presumption was 
inconsistent with the rules of equity.169  Winter simply held that a mere “possibility” of 
irreparable harm is incapable of satisfying the second preliminary injunction factor.170  However, 
given the irreparable nature of trademark infringement, as discussed above, once a finding 
supporting a likelihood of trademark infringement has been found, it is presumed that 
“irreparable harm is at least likely and not merely possible.”171  The issue of whether or not 
trademark infringement will result in irreparable harm to the trademark owner is often much 
clearer than it is in cases such as Winter.172  For trademark infringement cases where irreparable 
harm is more debatable, however, the presumption is rebuttable.173   
C. The Ninth Circuit Does Not Have the Support It Says It Does 
In spite of the Ninth Circuit’s assertions, it does not have the support of the Eleventh or 
Sixth Circuits on this issue.174  The Ninth Circuit cited to Audi and Axiom Worldwide and 
asserted that each case also declared the presumption was no longer valid in a preliminary 
                                                          
167 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 US 763 782, n.15 (1992) (J. Stevens, Concurring). 
168 See generally Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008); see also Sanchez, supra note 61, 
at 561. 
169 See id.; see also Sanchez, supra note 61, at 561. 
170 Id.  
171 Sanchez, supra note 61, at 555 (internal quotations omitted); see also McCarthy, supra note 37, at § 23:3 
(“Likelihood of confusion is synonymous with “probable” confusion—it is not sufficient if confusion is merely 
“possible.”).   
172 See Winter, 555 U.S. at 22-23. 
173 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:47:30. 
174 Id. at § 30:47. 
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injunction context.175  This could not be further from the truth.176  At issue in Audi, like eBay, 
was a permanent injunction.177  While the Sixth Circuit cited eBay, the court made no affirmative 
declaration that the presumption of irreparable harm no longer existed in a permanent injunction 
context, much less a preliminary injunction context.178  In addition, the Sixth Circuit’s analysis 
of irreparable harm appeared largely based on its finding that Audi was likely to succeed on its 
trademark infringement claim, demonstrating the presumptively irreparable nature of trademark 
infringement.179   
Similar to Audi, the Eleventh Circuit in Axiom Worldwide did not do away with the 
presumption of irreparable harm.180  The Eleventh Circuit’s recognition that the presumption has 
been under fire cannot be construed as a declaration that the presumption no longer exists, 
especially in light of the court explicitly refusing to decide the issue.181  The court also left it 
within the power of the district court, upon remand, to continue to apply the presumption.182  
Such a result, the court hinted, would still be in line with the “historical traditions” of the 
concurring opinions by Justices Roberts and Kennedy in eBay.183  Upon closer scrutiny of both 
Audi and Axiom Worldwide than the Ninth Circuit afforded those cases, it becomes clear that the 
Ninth Circuit does not have the support it says it does when asserting that the presumption no 
longer applies in trademark infringement cases.184  
                                                          
175 Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2013). 
176 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:47:30. 
177 Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 550 (6th Cir. 2006).   
178 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:47:30 n.7. 
179 See Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 542-545 (6th Cir. 2006).   
180 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:47:30. 
181 N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008). 
182 Id.  
183 Id.  
184 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:47:30 n.7.  It must be admitted, however, that in-spite of the incorrect 
assertion that the Herb Reed court had the support of the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, it has, since its decision, 
clearly gained the support of the Third Circuit.  Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 216 
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D. Taking Away the Presumption in Name Will Not Take Away from the Presumption in Effect  
Even if the express presumption of irreparable harm in trademark infringement cases 
were to be done away with, it would still exist in effect.  Without the express presumption of 
harm, plaintiffs would have no recourse to demonstrate irreparable harm but to “point[ ] to the 
fact that [a] trademark owner’s business goodwill and reputation are in peril” as a result of the 
infringement, and plaintiffs would do this by pointing to the likelihood of success on the merits 
for trademark infringement.185  This is already being demonstrated at the appellate level.186  Audi 
AG is an example of this.187  The Sixth Circuit relied exclusively on its finding that D’Amato’s 
selling of infringing items to consumers would cause irreparable harm to Audi.188  The court 
made no mention of the presumption, but just as the presumption would have courts do, the court 
inferred irreparable harm from a finding of infringement.189 The same result occurred in 
Paulsson.190  While stating that it would not expressly endorse the presumption in light of eBay, 
the court ultimately granted a preliminary injunction by citing to the defendant’s infringement, 
inferring that the defendant’s action would harm the plaintiff’s goodwill and reputation in current 
and future markets, and asserting that such harm was not quantifiable and, thus, irreparable.191     
                                                          
(3d Cir. 2014) (“We agree with the holding and rationale of the Herb Reed court”) (citing Herb Reed Enters., LLC 
v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc., 736 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2013). 
185 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:47:30. (citing Juice Couture, Inc. v. Bella Intern. Ltd., 930 F. Supp. 2d 489, 
503 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Paulsson Geophysical Services, Inc. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 312 (5th Cir. 2008).   
186 See, e.g. Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2006); Paulsson Geophysical Servs. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 
303 (5th Cir. 2008); Groupe SEB United States, Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 2014). 
187 See generally, Audi AG, 469 F.3d 534. 
188 Id. at 542-545. 
189 Id.  
190 Paulsson Geophysical Servs. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 2008). 
191 Id. at 313. 
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Even the Third Circuit, which declared in Ferring that it no longer applied a presumption 
of harm in Lanham Act cases, demonstrated in Euro-Pro that it is difficult to truly separate the 
likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm.192  The Third Circuit’s distinction 
between the presumption of irreparable harm and an “inference” of irreparable harm based on the 
facts of a case is simply laughable because, by its very definition, a presumption is nothing more 
than an inference based on facts already before a court.193  Just like the courts in Audi and 
Paulson, the Euro-Pro Court’s conclusion that irreparable harm would occur in this false-
advertising context rested largely on the likelihood of success on the merits of proving false-
advertising.194 
The Herb Reed court criticized the district court for talking in “platitudes” with its 
irreparable harm analysis and for not demanding any real evidence of such harm.195  However, 
missing from the Fifth Circuit decision is any clear standard as to what evidence could be 
presented to demonstrate irreparable harm.196  The court appeared to set a very high standard for 
demonstrating such harm when it said that actual “[e]vidence of loss of control over business 
reputation and damage to goodwill could constitute irreparable harm.”197  As demonstrated 
above, circuit courts have shown a tendency and need to rely more on the inference that 
trademark infringement will result in irreparable harm rather than force a whole new evidentiary 
inquiry where the harm at issue might not yet exist and be difficult to quantify.      
E. Procedural Safety Measures Ensure the Presumption is Not Too Powerful 
                                                          
192 Groupe SEB United States, Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 2014). 
193 Black’s Law Dictionary 1376 (10th ed. 2014). 
194 Euro-Pro, 774 F.3d at 205. 
195 Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir. 2013). 
196 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:47.  See also Herb Reed, 736 F.3d at 1250. 
197  Id. (citing Herb Reed, 736 F.3d at 1250). 
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The presumption of irreparable harm is not nearly as powerful as the Ninth Circuit 
believes it to be, because there are several other procedural hurdles that must be overcome before 
an injunction is actually put in place by the courts.  The first of these is that the presumption is 
rebuttable; the defendant still has the opportunity to demonstrate that their activities will not 
result in irreparable harm to the plaintiff.198  In addition, the presumption of irreparable harm 
only satisfies one of the four factors needed to get a preliminary injunction.199  Plaintiffs must 
still prove that they are likely to succeed on the trademark infringement claim, that the overall 
balance of equity favors them, and that an injunction is in the public’s best interest.200  
Furthermore, courts have consistently asserted that the presumption is most powerful in cases 
where the finding of a likelihood of confusion is very strong.201  In cases where the finding of 
confusion is not as strong, courts are sometimes more hesitant to presume irreparable harm.202     
Yet another procedural safeguard that protects the defendant from the presumption of 
irreparable harm is that a bond must be posted before a plaintiff can receive an injunction.203  
This bond must cover the “costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been 
wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”204  As a result, the bond amount can fluctuate wildly, from 
tens of thousands of dollars, to hundreds of thousands and even millions.205  The requirement of 
                                                          
198 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:47. 
199 See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).   
200 Id.  Admittedly, for the reasons discussed in Part IV, Section A, the fourth factor will likely always be in the 
favor of a plaintiff if there is a finding of trademark infringement since the purpose of trademark law is to protect 
consumers.   
201 See e.g. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 735 F.3d 735, 740 (7th Cir. 
2013); see also McCarthy, supra note 39, at § 30:45.  
202 Id. 
203 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). 
204 Id.  
205 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:55, n.1.   
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the plaintiff to post bond is not often waived.206  Contrary to the critics of the presumption, it has 
never “function[ed] as an automatic or general grant of an injunction[.]”207  
IV. Conclusion 
In spite of the Herb Reed decision, plaintiffs such as Herb Reed should not have the 
presumption of irreparable harm taken away from them when they have a likelihood of success 
on the merits in proving trademark infringement.  There are many reasons to come to this 
conclusion.  First, despite their shared moniker of “intellectual property,” trademarks have 
consistently been treated differently under the law than patents and copyrights because each has 
a different constitutional foundation and serves a different purpose in society.  In addition, the 
harms associated with the infringement of trademarks are inherently irreparable, and this notion 
of inherent irreparableness is accepted in other causes of action.     
Secondly, a more thorough textual analysis of the majority and concurring opinions in the 
Supreme Court’s eBay Inc., v. MercExchange, LLC and Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 
decisions reveal, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s cursory analysis, that the presumption of 
irreparable harm is consistent with those decisions.  Thirdly, the Herb Reed court has much less 
support from the other circuit courts than it asserted it does.  Upon a closer reading of the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision in Audi AG and the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Axiom Worldwide, neither 
Circuit, as the Herb Reed court asserted, declared that the presumption could no longer be 
applied in trademark infringement cases. 
Fourth, the Ninth Circuit failed to realize that even if the express presumption of 
irreparable harm is taken away, it is still going to exist behind the scenes and influence the 
                                                          
206 Id. at § 30:55.   
207 Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 217 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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outcome of trademark infringement cases.  This is already being demonstrated at the circuit 
level.  Finally, the Ninth Circuit gave no recognition to the fact that the presumption of 
irreparable harm is not the only inquiry in granting a preliminary injunction in a trademark 
infringement suit.  There are several other factors and procedural hurdles that must be met in 
order for a preliminary injunction to be implemented.  Together, these factors demonstrate that 
the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion is not the correct one and could potentially cause great harm to the 
consuming public and to trademark owners trying to police their rights.    
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